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Nature, environmentalism, and the politics of citizenship in post-civil war 
Lebanon 
 
Introduction 
 
 
In 1985, in the midst of the Lebanese civil war, a young man named Bechara had a vision to 
overcome violent conflict by taking groups of children from different sectarian backgrounds 
to the country’s mountainous hinterland for a two-week camp.  The idea behind the camp, 
as Bechara1 explained to us almost three decades later, was to remove young people from 
their increasingly ‘ghettoized’ existence and to mix them together in order to bring down 
‘the walls of prejudice’ between them.  He explained, ‘We wanted to go against the war, so 
we needed to go against separation…We are all Lebanese.  The idea was to make unity’. 
Nature was not incidental to Bechara’s strategy; rather, he suggested, nature provided a 
context for unity and the calming of hostilities.  This view has informed his activities up to 
the present day.  Now the head of a full-fledged non-governmental organization (NGO) with 
support from the European Union, Bechara continues to gather together young people 
whenever conflict flares up (a frequent occurrence in Lebanon) and to send them to camp 
in the countryside, away from the deep-seated antagonisms and divisiveness of city 
neighborhoods. 
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Bechara is not alone in his regard for the curative properties of nature.  For many civil-
society actors, especially those affiliated with Western donor-funded NGOs, the remedy for 
Lebanon's political troubles resides at least partly with the natural environment and 
people’s contact with it.  Environmental preservation efforts and urban green-space 
advocacy, as well as the promotion of hiking, camping, scouting, and eco-tourism, have thus 
featured prominently in the NGO sector, forming the basis of Lebanon’s contemporary 
environmentalist movement.    In this paper, we explore the way environmental thought—
much of it drawing on Western discourses linking environmental practice to individual and 
collective transformation—has been interwoven with a variety of political projects in 
Lebanon, starting with the formation of the Lebanese state as Christian homeland in the 
early 20th century.   Our main focus is on the ways contemporary civil-society actors, 
especially Western-supported NGOs, deploy particular understandings of nature and green 
space in their attempts to reconstitute citizenship and to re-imagine Lebanon as a unified, 
multi-confessional nation-state.  Civil-society actors, we show, idealize nature as providing a 
neutral space in which Lebanese from different confessional backgrounds can come 
together and develop a collective consciousness, and they use environmental practices as a 
means to develop new social norms built around ideas of empowerment, individual 
responsibility, and consensus.  These understandings and uses of the environment are 
profoundly—and intentionally—depoliticizing, though we emphasize that ‘politics’ in the 
form of dissent and protest are present in Lebanon’s environmental movement.  
Ultimately, however, the capacity for NGOs to transform Lebanese society through 
environmental activism and nature-oriented activities is limited both by the entanglement 
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of NGOs in sectarian politics and the involvement of sectarian groups in the environmental 
movement.   
 
The following account draws on intensive, semi-structured interviews conducted between 
2010 and 2011 and again between 2013 and 2014 in Lebanon.  These interviews have been 
collected as part of a larger, multi-country project on youth citizenship initiatives in post-
conflict societies; we have thus far collected interviews with representatives of 41 NGOs for 
the Lebanon component of this study.  The project, we reiterate, does not focus on 
environmentalism, per se, but rather, on the aims and impacts of citizenship initiatives in 
our study sites.  Yet themes relating to environment, nature, and green space surfaced 
repeatedly in our interviews, and many of the organizations we included in the study 
sponsor a variety of environmental activities, from beach clean-ups to open-space advocacy 
to camps and rural/eco tourism (as we explain below, many NGOs have multiple remits).  
Having observed the prominence of environmental activities in Lebanese civil society, we 
gathered further information about environmental thought and practice through interviews 
with urban planners and individual environmentalists, and through participation in eco-
tourism activities.  The following account describes the emergence of environmental 
discourse in Lebanon and explains how and why the environment, nature and green space 
have come to play a prominent role in recent efforts to develop citizenship and national 
identity.  We begin with a more general overview of the ways in which nature and the 
environment have been implicated historically in the formulation of national identity and 
citizenship.  
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Nature and the production of nationhood and citizenship 
 
Geographers and environmental historians have long been interested in the production of 
‘nature’ as a discrete entity separate from human society and as an object of governance, 
control, management, and commodification.2  Here, we are concerned not so much with 
the actual governance of nature as with the ways in which discourses and practices around 
nature and environment ‘become part of the implementation and contestation of particular 
social and political realities’.3  In other words, we are interested in the ways that social 
actors deploy ideas about and representations of nature and the environment toward 
certain social and political ends, and especially toward nation- and citizenship-building 
projects.    
 
Scholars provide many examples of the ways in which ideas about nature and 
environmental practices have figured in the production of modern nationhood and 
citizenship in Western contexts.  Scholarship on the romantic nationalisms of the 19th 
century, in particular, highlights the close association between political ideology, 
representations of nature, and environmental practice.  As Kaufmann and Zimmer remark, 
the search for ‘authentic’ landscapes was integral to the ‘search for national pedigrees’, 
which ‘had come to form the centrepiece of most European nationalisms and national 
identities’ by the late 18th century.4  The proliferation of hiking and nature preservation 
groups throughout Europe at this time indicated the ways in which Western thought 
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endowed nature with transformative capabilities.  It was not simply that the natural 
landscape embodied national identity and national character, but that by going into nature, 
people would undergo personal and collective transformation.  Hiking and camping, in the 
first instance, provided direct encounters with the sublime that would purify the individual 
soul while fostering collective emotional attachment to homeland and a bounded national 
community.5  Moreover, the development of an international scouting movement in the 
early 20th century, and the popularization of summer camps, reflected a belief that being in 
nature would foster desired social values and orientations, produce useful and productive 
citizens (often articulated in highly gendered terms as ‘tough’ and self-sufficient), and 
generate patriotism and national/imperial greatness.6   
 
The connections made between ‘a healthy youth, a salving nature, and a well-governed 
nation’7 were present also in the urban park movement that emerged in the late 19th 
century in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere.   Urban elites embraced 
environmental determinist thought, which held that ‘the character of society flowed from 
its surroundings’8.  It was crucial, from this perspective, to beautify urban space and to 
expose urban dwellers to the moral uplift provided by nature.  Nature and other forms of 
beauty provided no less than a moral order in industrial cities marred (in the eyes of 
middle-class ‘Progressive’ reformers) by crime, deviance, filth, social isolation, and 
corruption.  Parks in many instances were designed and situated for accessibility, as it was 
through frequent use of the urban park that the working-class poor would develop civic 
virtues, thereby smoothing over deep class divisions present in turn-of-the-century urban 
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society.  Maintaining this therapeutic, uplifting splendor in the midst of the city, however, 
required active policing and management of the physical landscape to exclude behaviors 
deemed immoral or incompatible with the ‘natural’ environment.9  
 
Western environmentalism, of course, has moved on from late 19th century romantic 
nationalism and Progressivism.  The growing body of literature advocating ‘green citizenship’ 
seems more inclined to advocate the wholesale transformation of modern citizenship—
including notions of rights, civic responsibilities, and democratic participation—as a means of 
encouraging more ecologically centered societies, than to treat the environment itself as a 
wellspring of citizenship values and norms.10  But established modes of environmental 
determinism, which understand the environment and environmental practices to shape society 
and to produce ideal citizens, very much persist in contemporary environmentalism, as seen 
with the growing advocacy surrounding community gardens and urban farming.   Mary Beth 
Pudup11 argues that the community garden movement has gradually transitioned from a 
countermovement against consumerism and corporate power in the 1970s to an instrument of 
neoliberal governmentality promoted by the non-profit sector, the goal of which is to promote 
the personal changes in attitude and behavior supposedly necessary to overcome social 
marginalization.  Community gardening, in other words, ‘puts individuals in charge of their own 
adjustment(s) to economic restructuring and social dislocation through self-help technologies 
centered on personal contact with nature’.12  This and many other examples of environmental 
and green space activism indicate the ways in which the environment—both cultivated and 
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‘wild’—continues to function as a moral landscape that represents and generates societal 
virtues and that must therefore be purged of inappropriate uses and behaviors.13  
 
These ways of thinking about the environment, nationhood, and citizenship, as our 
examples have indicated, are very much tied to Western contexts.  But they have also 
exerted a significant influence in post-colonial societies across long histories of interaction 
with Western missionaries, educators, merchants, occupying forces, and development 
agencies.  The influence of Western environmental thought and practice in post-colonial 
contexts has been complex and not entirely straightforward.  On the one hand, Western 
environmentalism has served the purposes of colonial and post-colonial domination in 
Africa, Asia, and elsewhere.14  On the other hand, environmentalist discourse (certainly not 
all of it imported from the West) has been used for anti-colonial resistance and in struggles 
against the post-colonial developmentalist state, which has typically emphasized the 
intensive exploitation of natural resources.15  Amidst these instances of domination and 
resistance have been perhaps more ambiguous cases in which local elites have mobilized 
environmental discourse and practice within post-colonial nation-building projects and in 
broader efforts to produce ‘modern’ citizens.  In the case of Lebanon, generations of 
environmentalists in Lebanon have drawn upon Western (and increasingly 
internationalized) environmental discourses, with their multifarious connections to ideas of 
citizenship and nationhood, to fashion particular political orders, or to challenge existing 
ones.  In the following sections, we ask, how have ideas about nature and citizenship 
become meaningful in the post-civil war Lebanese context?  What purpose do these ideas 
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serve in configuring new political realities?   And what possibilities do they hold for 
effecting meaningful political transformations?  To start, we explore how ideas about 
nature and the environment have been woven into the country’s fractious political history.   
 
 
Lebanese environmental thought and sectarianism in historical context 
 
Lebanon was carved out of the Ottoman province of Syria after World War I by French 
mandate rulers at the behest of the region’s Maronite Christians, an Eastern-rite sect that 
had been in communion with the Roman Catholic Church since the 13th century and that 
had enjoyed significant political autonomy in Mount Lebanon since the 1860s thanks to 
European intervention.  The very idea of Lebanon, in this respect, from the start was 
associated almost exclusively with Maronite political ideology16  As with their counterparts 
in Europe, nationalist elites in Lebanon wove themes of nature and landscape into their 
narratives of national origins and uniqueness.  At this time, Mount Lebanon’s cedar trees, 
which feature prominently in the Bible, became an important, and rather loaded, symbol of 
Lebanese national identity.   As Karim Makdisi notes, the cedar’s relevance lay in connecting 
the nascent Lebanese state to ancient, pre-Islamic Lebanon; using the symbol of the cedars, 
in other words, Maronite elites distinguished Mount Lebanon and the Maronite community 
from the rest of Arab region and justified the formation of a country separate from Syria, 
whose predominantly Muslim population was more inclined to rally behind Arab and/or 
Syrian nationalism17  Adding to this charged symbolism, the image of the cedar was 
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originally placed on the French tricolor, signaling Maronite elites’ close affiliation with the 
French colonial administration.   
 
While the creation of Lebanon was largely a matter of Maronite political will, the country’s 
elites—Sunni, Shi’a, Druze, and Christian— accepted Lebanese independence as a practical 
matter and achieved a measure of accommodation amongst themselves by dividing key 
political posts and electoral seats between the country’s main confessional groups.18  
Christian, Muslim, and Druze elites in the post-independence period embraced and carried 
forward the environmental consciousness that had emerged during the French Mandate, 
weaving ideas about nature into their particular political programs and philosophies.  Most 
notable was Kamal Jumblatt, the leader of the Druze community who had been educated in 
French-Catholic school in Lebanon and later at the Sorbonne.  Jumblatt was a committed 
leftist whose almost mystical regard for nature, and his concern with the growing distance 
between humanity and nature, were incorporated into his progressive ideology.  He 
created the Lebanese League for Bird Preservation to combat over-hunting, and he 
reportedly scattered the seeds of cedar trees in the Shouf region, which is today the site of 
a biosphere reserve controlled by the Jumblatt family (we return to this in the conclusion).  
During the post-independence period, as well, the country’s Maronite president and Sunni 
prime minister ‘celebrated the importance of nature’ with the ‘Eid al Shajara’, or Tree Day, 
and the country experienced the expansion of scouting movement, which had first made an 
appearance during the late Ottoman period.19   
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The 1960s saw a new kind of environmentalism emerging in Lebanon, one tied less to 
sectarian elites than to civil society, which was expanding in Lebanon at this time in part 
due to the inflow of donor funds.  This environmentalism was led by Western-educated 
professionals fluent in international norms.   A key figure in the Lebanese environmental 
movement was Ricardus Haber, a botanist at the American University of Beirut, who had 
been a Boy Scout in his home region of the Shouf and who was influenced by Scouts 
founder Robert Baden-Powell and American naturalist John Muir.  Haber created one of the 
first explicitly environmental NGOs in Lebanon in 1972, called the Friends of Nature, 20 
which spoke out against the country’s unbridled urban development and its seeming 
immunity to urban planning.21    In their efforts to protect Lebanon’s natural environment 
from the degradation caused by urban sprawl, Ricardus Haber and Friends of Nature have 
been described as scrupulously non-political.  But the kind of activism Haber espoused in 
the 1970s (and continues to espouse) was not so much non-political or apolitical as it was 
reflective of a kind of politics built upon accommodation with the sectarian status quo.  
Haber’s main interest, in other words, was not to enact political transformation but to build 
consensus and a common identity, given the existing political reality, around Lebanon’s 
natural patrimony.22  This was, as Karim Makdisi notes, a very different kind of 
environmental politics than that which emerged among Lebanon’s impoverished, rural Shi’a 
communities in the 1960s, which focused on unequal access to water, land, and other 
natural resources. 23   
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Lebanon’s environmentalist movement was hampered by the outbreak of civil war in 1975, 
following years of discontent with the Maronites’ tight grip on political power.24  The war 
saw the mobilization of militias organized primarily along sectarian lines, each holding 
conflicting understandings of Lebanon’s national identity and its relationship to the Arab 
world.   The war was devastating both socially and environmentally.  Militia control over 
urban and national space—maintained through checkpoints and barriers-- signaled growing 
polarization and isolation among the Lebanese population.  Downtown Beirut, long 
celebrated for its cosmopolitanism, was gutted, and the city’s residents retreated behind 
sectarian lines, with many Christians fleeing to newly built suburbs stretching north from 
the capital.  With the collapse of public services, limited in scope even before the war, 
Lebanon faced environmental devastation through deforestation and the dumping of 
garbage and untreated sewage (Lebanon also became a dumping ground for toxic 
chemicals from Europe).    
 
The post-civil war Lebanese state—which remains factionalized along sectarian lines—has 
been able to accomplish little in the way of (re)building public services, controlling 
development, or dealing with environmental problems in any kind of consistent or 
centralized fashion.25  Into this situation (not so much a power void as a fragmented system 
of patron-client networks) has stepped a resurgent civil society consisting of NGOs, whose 
growth has been fuelled by Western largesse.26  As in the pre-civil war period, NGOs have 
become the standard-bearers of environmentalism.  NGOs involved in environmental 
activities continue to describe their work as ‘apolitical’ or non-political, but it is hard to 
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ignore the ways in which environmental discourse and practice has become intertwined 
with a broader set of goals relating to the production of a new societal order.  Few NGOs 
are dedicated exclusively to the preservation of nature for its own sake.  Instead, most 
NGOs who run environmental and green-space programs are addressing a suite of issues, 
including women’s empowerment, youth empowerment, local economic development, 
leadership training, and/or democratic participation.  These multipurpose NGOs are explicit 
in their intent to transform Lebanese society and to form new kinds of citizens armed with 
skills in consensus building, conflict resolution, and self-empowerment.  These citizens, in 
turn, will have the capacity to create a new, political reality in the country in which the 
authority of sectarian leaders, or za‘im, will be (ideally) greatly diminished.   
 
In the following discussion, we explore how NGOs, drawing on internationalized discourses 
of environment and citizenship, are mobilizing ideas about nature and green space in their 
efforts to create new Lebanese citizens.  Our discussion concludes by considering the ways 
in which these efforts are limited both by the continued prominence of sectarian leaders, 
who themselves have used environmentalism for their own political gain, and by NGOs’ 
associations with Western donors, whose politics implicate them in the very sectarian 
system they wish to undermine. 
 
 
Environmental activism and civil society organizations in post-civil war Lebanon 
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The end of the civil war saw a remarkable upsurge of environmental activism in Lebanon 
dedicated to nature protection and rural preservation, the promotion of hiking and 
camping, especially for youth, and advocacy for publicly accessible green spaces in cities.  
As in the pre-civil war period, the Friends of Nature—which reportedly had 3,000 members 
by the early 1990s—had an important role in leading environmental initiatives after the civil 
war.  Ricardus Haber himself was instrumental in creating two nature reserves in the 
1990s—the Horsh Ehden Preserve in the mountainous Zghora region in northern Lebanon, 
and the Palm Island reserve off the coast of Tripoli.  Another important initiative has been 
the Lebanese Mountain Trail (LMT), a project conceived by Joseph Karam, who was inspired 
by the Appalachian Trail during his years living in the U.S.  The LMT, which is today nearly 
230 miles long, has been given over $3 million of USAID funding as part of a program to 
support rural tourism and economic development.  It is used extensively by ecotourism 
groups like Vamos Todos and Cyclamen, who are committed to environmental and cultural 
preservation and the promotion of rural tourism.   Yet another high-profile environmental 
NGO is the Association for Forest Development and Conservation (AFDC), which like the 
LMT, has received substantial support from Western aid agencies, including USAID. This 
organization was founded following a devastating forest fire near the village of Ramlieh and 
began as a tree-nursery and reforestation program before branching into rural tourism and 
rural hostels.  A final example is an organization called Green Line, a name that makes ironic 
reference to the desolate no-man’s-land that separated Christian East Beirut and Muslim 
West Beirut during the civil war.  This organization was founded in 1991 by professors and 
students from the American University of Beirut who—in the words of the organization’s 
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promotional material—‘decided to translate their concern about the post-war devastated 
cultural, human and natural environment into an organized action [to] expose 
environmental threats; to popularize environmental awareness; and to contribute towards 
a scientific framework for a sustainable environmental management policy’. The 
organization today is funded by numerous American and European agencies and advocates 
clean energy policy, organic farming, eco-tourism, school gardens, and a variety of other 
initiatives. 
 
For all of these organizations and others like them, nature and wilderness, as well as urban 
green space and the cultivated rural environment, are important not only for their own 
sake but because they offer a means by which Lebanon might achieve unity and overcome 
sectarian divisions.  The LMT website, for instance, describes the trail as not only 
showcasing Lebanon’s natural beauty and cultural heritage, but also as ‘bringing 
communities closer together’ while expanding economic opportunities in rural areas.  
AFDC, likewise, holds ‘green leadership’ programs at its rural hostels with the idea that 
young people will more easily find common ground if they are removed from the divisive 
environment of sectarian neighborhoods and are exposed to the essential Lebaneseness of 
rural life.  There is, then, a great deal of faith placed in nature and the environment to 
transform the ways that Lebanese people (and especially Lebanese youth) understand and 
perform societal membership.   
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These NGOs, it  must be noted, are working with very specific understandings of citizenship 
that, far from unique to the Lebanese context, are pervasive among Western-funded NGOs 
in post-conflict and divided societies (and in the West itself).  NGO workers whom we 
interviewed—many of them educated in the West or at English- or French-language 
institutions—explained citizenship in several interrelated ways: as individuals’ contribution 
to collective well-being; as  community and individual ‘empowerment’ and engagement in 
order to overcome obstacles to well-being and development; and as the ability to speak 
across difference and to achieve consensus.27  Nature and green space are seen to be 
instrumental in enacting this kind of citizenship in several ways, some of them indicated in 
the examples above.  The environment, for instance, provides people with opportunities, 
especially in poor rural regions, to take responsibility for their own social and economic 
well-being through ecotourism and organic farming.  Lebanon’s sublime natural and rural 
landscapes, as well, become a means of creating emotional attachments between Lebanese 
people and the land (here we see echoes of 19th century romantic nationalism), thereby 
building a stronger commitment toward Lebanon as a place and as an idea.   Nature also 
provides a ‘neutral’ physical space, presumably distinct from sectarian space, in which 
individuals can leave behind narrow confessional affiliations and  perform Lebaneseness by 
partaking in camping, hiking, and rural-heritage activities or in activities that benefit the 
country as a whole (such as beach clean-up efforts, a popular activity among environmental 
groups).  It is a space, in other words, in which otherwise dissociated actors learn to be 
citizens through activities and opportunities for engagement, interaction, and dialogue.  As 
one of our interviewees explained, 
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The environment unites us because it affects us equally…[We do 
activities] up in the mountains [because] we want to encourage [youth] 
to give back, and this giving back is translated into environmental 
projects—into creating environmental clubs or re-planting projects.  It’s a 
good introduction to the idea of giving back.  The environment is not 
politicized, though in some ways, it does get politicized, as we see with 
illegal quarries in Lebanon that are often owned by politicians.  But still 
the environment is a method to bring people together. 
 
Further to this point, some of our interviews described the way in which lack of exposure to 
nature and open space had had deleterious effects on the Lebanese, exacerbating existing 
social divisions and making it impossible for people—and especially young people—to 
interact with others in a peaceful manner.   Creating green space, then, is about creating 
venues in which social divisions and tensions can be diminished, and in which people learn 
to be at ease with each other.  Thus, Ahmed28, another interviewee involved in green-space 
activism in Beirut, states,  
 
Look, children need to play.  It’s the way they develop their personality.   
Now, if you’re children want to play, where do they play?...In the 
Lebanese mentality, the street is for the bad people, so they can’t go to 
the street.  So where can they go then?  They stay in the house, which 
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means you can’t express yourself.  You’re shut up.  And this leads for sure 
to violence, drugs.  If we don’t express ourselves, especially with the 
tension from the war…If we can’t play, then we can’t express, we can’t 
release the tension inside of us.  Where is the tension going?  
 
Ahmed has long championed the re-opening of the Beirut Pine Forest (Horsh Beirut), one of 
the city’s few remaining green spaces, and one that has shrunk dramatically in the past few 
decades due to development.  The park was reportedly used as a dumping ground for 
bodies during the civil war, and many of the trees were destroyed during the war for use as 
fuel.  After the war, the French government sponsored reforestation efforts, but the park 
has remained mostly inaccessible to the public, except for occasional, planned festivals.  
This individual and his organization, along with individual activists affiliated with other 
NGOs and universities, have sponsored various events and campaigns aimed at opening the 
park to the public. Significantly, this activism is conducted alongside (Western-funded) 
youth dialogue and leadership activities—in other words, mobilization around the park is a 
means of training young people to interact peacefully and to empower themselves and 
their communities.  The open space itself, if and when it is ever opened to the public, will 
be the physical space in which inter-sectarian community-building will take place.  Ahmed 
states,  
 
We want cultural exchange between our people; we want Horsh Beirut to be a 
daily cultural exchange.  People will start to communicate, start to understand 
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each other…We’ll have less violence.  We’ll have a feeling of belonging more.  
We will raise more and more the feeling of understanding.  And then the one in 
the Sunni area will go to the Christian area because he as friends there…and 
then they will start to feel they are one country.  This is what we believe in.  I 
don’t know if it will happen [laughs].  But we need to try.  We have nothing 
else! 
 
The idea of green space as a means of fostering dialogue and inter-communal harmony is 
also articulated by Zeina, a British-educated urban planner who has single-handedly been 
promoting the ecological restoration of the old Beirut rail yard.  For Zeina, the rehabilitation 
of the rail yard and the creation of publicly-accessible green space would signify the re-
unification of Beirut, and by extension, Lebanese society, after the dislocation and 
polarization of the civil war.  She states: 
 
The civil war fragmented the city, and there was no center for 15 years.  
There were little centers in different neighborhoods that were dominated 
by militias and sectarian political leaders.  Martyr’s Square, which had 
served as an important central point since the early 20th century, lost its 
function.  This was a place where people from all backgrounds met.  There 
were cinemas and theaters close by, and it connected to the souqs and 
the waterfront…When it ceased to exist during the civil war…streets 
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became very hostile places and there were few spaces in which people 
could interact with each other. 
 
Zeina notes that there are a few open spaces where people are able to mix and interact in 
Beirut, including the Corniche, a paved promenade that runs along the seafront.  But she is 
insistent on the specific value of green public space:  without green space in the city, people 
rely on cars; they don’t walk anywhere, they don’t encounter other people face-to-face, 
and the whole situate creates stress, pollution, and strains on mental health.  ‘People’, she 
argues,  
 
are very disconnected from nature, and historically, we were always close to 
nature.  I would like to reintroduce wilderness into the city, in old, derelict 
industrial areas…Green spaces don’t need to be manicured…just something 
green.   
 
The old rail yard is especially appropriate to her mission, she suggests, not only because of 
the ecological lushness of the space, but because of the possibility the space offers for 
coming to terms with the torture and violence that took place there during the civil war.  
This gruesome history, she argues, should not be covered, but should be part of the story of 
the rail yard and a means of fostering healing and open discussion about the war, in 
contrast to what some Lebanese commentators have called Lebanon’s post-war ‘collective 
amnesia’.29 
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A final example of the ways in which activists put their faith in nature and green space as 
means of effecting societal transformation is Amal, whose life as a green-space activist 
began with a public intervention on World Environment Day that involved putting small 
squares of turf around Beirut with a sign reading ‘Enjoy your green space’.  This 
intervention, of course, was an ironic gesture intended to raise awareness among Beirutis 
of their lack of green space.  In a subsequent, bolder gesture, Amal, along with fellow 
activists, transformed a densely built area in central Beirut into a temporary green space 
and park using sod.30    For Amal, as for the other interviewees, the importance of green 
space relates to the need to defuse societal tensions—to create a peaceful environment in 
which people can interact and set aside differences.  Speaking of her days as a student in 
Paris, she states,  
 
It was part of my daily routine to sit in parks and have my coffee there…It 
was part of my life, and then when I moved back here—I always lived in 
Beirut, but I wasn’t very sensitive about the subject before…I was like, 
wow, I really miss this.  It’s very important to have space in a city…You get 
aware once you see how important it is in other cities; how relaxed people 
are in parks, and how there is this exchange between people that’s non-
existent here. 
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Like other interviewees, she cites the importance of green spaces for reducing pollution, for 
improving mental health and stress levels.  ‘Imagine’, she states, ‘if you have the space to 
let out your anger’.  Like other interviewees, as well, she recognizes the need to change the 
middle-class Lebanese mindset that being in a publicly accessible green space or garden is 
somehow disreputable.  Creating parks for Amal is about creating attractive public spaces, 
encouraging people from different backgrounds to go to them, and creating a new 
collective consciousness.   
 
In advocating for spaces of interaction and dialogue, and in fostering a sense of common 
identity and common purpose around and through environmental and green-space 
preservation, the activists are (from their perspective) producing a new form of politics that 
stands in stark contrast to the status quo of sectarian discord and divisiveness. Nature and 
green space, they suggest, is a remedy for corrosive sectarianism, making possible a kind of 
‘depoliticized politics’ centered on interaction, dialogue, and community-building; and it is a 
realm in which Lebanese can perform modern citizenship built upon notions of active 
engagement and meaningful, pragmatic improvement to quality of life.   This kind of 
politics, as described earlier, is closely associated with Western donor-funded NGOs in 
many post-conflict societies, and critics have often charged that the depoliticized 
understanding of citizenship and participation offered by NGOs serves mainly as an 
instrument of neo-liberal governance that closes off more radical forms of dissent and 
protest.31  However, as attached as they are to notions of consensus and inter-communal 
harmony, our interviews are not necessarily averse to more contentious forms of politics.  
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Their clear commitment to depoliticized modes of societal membership, in other words, is 
tempered by their actual political practices and consciousness.   
 
To illustrate, embedded in many of the comments of our interviewees were running 
critiques of the key actors who dominate urban development in Lebanon—sectarian 
political leaders and real estate developers, who are often one and the same.  In advocating 
green space and environmental preservation, they are not only seeking ‘community’, but 
they (like environmentalists in the 1960s) are also protesting against the utter lack of public 
control over land- and natural resource use, especially in Beirut, and the extreme 
prioritization of exchange values over use values.  Interviewees reserve particular vitriol for 
the redeveloped downtown of Beirut, which has been managed by a public-private 
corporation called Solidere since the end of the civil war.32   The Solidere district was touted 
as a model of ‘smart’ urban design, with preserved Ottoman-era facades, pedestrianized 
streets, and landscaped waterfront boulevards.  But it has been widely criticized by 
scholars, activists, and ordinary people for being inaccessible even to the middle class, 
much less the poor, and as having torn out the soul of the city, and hence, the country 
itself.33  Amal, for instance, after insisting that she is non-political, changes tack, stating,  
 
The lack of green space is a political issue.  I’m not saying I’m against any group, 
but look at downtown.  Downtown is supposed to be public to everyone.  What 
the hell? [laughs]  It’s supposed to be a public space.  Okay, I know a private 
company took it to reconstruct it…[but] this is not how you do it.  The downtown 
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of a city is not this way.  You don’t just wipe away all the history and the 
character of a city this way.  It was really wiped out in a way. Things in this 
country are not done with the right attitude…There’s no emphasis on citizenship 
or the social issues, what people really want. 
 
She follows this by describing citizenship as having rights to public green spaces, as well as 
to public libraries and other public services, and as having a role in determining the 
contours of city life.  Later, she describes her personal blog in which she posts pictures of 
the city; in one of her postings, she included photographs of the massive luxury apartment 
towers that are ubiquitous in the downtown area, pointing out how many of them, 
ironically, include the word ‘gardens’ in their name.  Her critique centers not only on the 
obliteration of Beirut’s historic gardens and villas, but also the lack of affordability of the 
housing being built.  Gradually and perhaps haltingly, she has found herself thinking about 
taking a more overtly political stance with her green-space activities:   
 
A lot of people at the event on Saturday [when they covered a paved area in turf] 
were like, wow, let’s just close it and let’s be more…I’m not going to say violent 
because it sounds wrong, and our whole intervention is a very pacifist 
intervention.  But they were like, ‘Let’s go and picnic in front of Horsh Beirut’, for 
example.  A lot of people said it like, ‘Let’s go and be a bit more aggressive in our 
attitude’. 
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Ahmed has been more willing to confront powerful urban interests in the effort to secure 
green space.  He was instrumental, for instance, in stopping the conversion of the Sanaya 
Gardens, one of the few publicly accessible gardens remaining in the city, into a parking lot 
by municipal interests who had an obvious financial stake in the deal.34  Referring to these 
officials, he states, heatedly, ‘They don’t do anything for people.  They just do things to take 
money.  All the municipalities—not only Beirut.  All of them.  What gains money, they do it’.  
He continues by connecting the unwillingness of municipal officials to open Horsh Beirut to 
the redevelopment of downtown Beirut by Solidere and its powerful allies in the French 
government.  He states, 
 
Look at Beirut’s downtown now.  They rebuilt it, but to me, they build our 
country with no soul…..All of our memories were destroyed.  So if we have no 
memory, we have no future, we have no personality, we have no character.  So 
that’s why we are also saying the Horsh Beirut is a historical place.  And they say, 
‘We don’t want to open Horsh Beirut because people will destroy it…Actually, I 
believe that the main reason they don’t want to open Horsh Beirut is because if 
they want to open something, they have to get money. 
 
Facing the endless stonewalling by municipal officials, Ahmed took action:  
 
I told the municipality of Beirut, ‘You made an agreement, and I want to see the 
agreement’.  They say, ‘You can’t see the agreement’…  So they can do whatever 
25 
 
they want in the government, the parliament, and the municipality.  And I can 
know nothing about what’s going on.  I have nothing.  So, I have to steal 
documents to build my case.  And this is what happened to build the legal file.  
You have to steal things. You have to ask NGOs, ‘Did you have an agreement with 
Beirut municipality? Can I take it from you?  You take it from the NGO in a secret 
way.  And the agreement usually mentions other agreements… 
 
Stealing documents does not exactly exemplify the kind of radical democratic politics 
espoused by political theorists; still it is important to note that NGOs, despite their 
commitment to depoliticized forms of citizenship practice, are not entirely cowed by 
powerful interests, and that they do practice various forms of dissent that serve to 
undermine existing forms of authority.  The lingering question, however, is, to what extent 
are these activists able to effect the societal transformations they wish to make?  To what 
degree have they reconfigured citizenship in Lebanon or created a collective identity 
around Lebanon’s natural environment and rural heritage?  In our concluding thoughts, we 
examine some of the limits of environmental advocacy in creating a new political order in 
Lebanon. 
 
Conclusion: A new political reality? 
 
Western-funded NGOs have a ubiquitous presence in Lebanon—there are hundreds of 
organizations in Lebanon today, most of them centered in Beirut but with remits to serve 
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different regions in the country.  Through these organizations thousands of Lebanese 
people –especially young people, who are often the target of donor and NGO activities--
throughout the country have been exposed to internationalized discourses about 
citizenship and the environment through their participation in camping, scouting, eco-
tourism, leadership training programs, school curricula, local preservation initiatives, and 
the like.  But it is difficult to ascertain exactly how people interpret, understand, and act 
upon these environmental and citizenship discourses.  NGOs, we have observed in our 
fieldwork, while wishing to reach out to the population at large, have a tendency to 
cultivate relatively small numbers of young people who become well versed in international 
norms but whose relationship with other Lebanese who have less exposure to international 
discourses seems somewhat tenuous.  It is therefore not clear whether the environment is 
an effective instrument in generating desired transformations (our on-going research 
attempts to addresses this question).   
 
The unknown but undoubtedly uneven reach of NGOs and their philosophies can be 
connected to a deeper set of problems that face NGOs and environmental activists.  First, 
while NGOs aim to dislodge Lebanon’s sectarian political system in Lebanon, they are, in 
fact, implicated in this system by virtue of their associations with Western donors.  We 
hesitate to describe NGOs as the servants of Western geopolitical interests, yet it is the 
case that Western donors regard support for NGOs as a means of achieving their 
geopolitical aims in the region and that NGOs often tailor their activities to satisfy donor 
aims.35  In the case of Lebanon, Western donors have supported NGOs in order to counter 
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the influence of Hizbullah, a large, militant Shi’a organization that is allied with Iran.  By 
‘saving’ Lebanon from its own divisive tendencies, Western donors aim to create a stable 
and reliable ‘partner’ in the Middle East that can resist Iran’s influence.  Those NGOs who 
accept funds from large U.S. donor agencies like USAID or the Middle East Partnership 
Initiative are forbidden to deal in any way with Hizbullah, which closes them off to a large 
segment of the Shi’a population while simultaneously making them party to current 
struggles between Shi’a and Sunni populations.  NGOs, then, far from transcending the 
sectarian politics, are very much part of it—a point that many of our interviewees recognize 
and seek to rectify by finding non-U.S. funding streams. 
 
Second, sectarian leaders themselves have picked up on many of the same themes 
espoused by NGOs, using environmentalism toward their own ends—not least to provide a 
veneer of legitimacy to their real-estate dealings.  Paul Kingston36 remarks that Lebanon’s 
sectarian elites have been ‘very effective in coopting, fragmenting, and narrowing the scope 
of environmental activity in post-civil war Lebanon’ by exercising monopolies over 
environmental activities in their areas.  By participating in umbrella organizations like the 
Lebanese Environmental Forum (LEF), sectarian leaders have been able to sideline more 
independently minded NGOs and to dilute the demands of environmentalists relating to 
development.  Moreover, they have used the LEF to channel donor funds to protected 
areas under their control.  In fairness, some elements of this sectarian elite—like the 
Jumblatt family (mentioned earlier)—have been more sincere in their support of 
environmentalism.  Kingston suggests that under the leadership of a Jumblatt ally in late 
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1990s, the newly created Ministry of the Environment enjoyed the support of NGOs and 
independent environmentalists.  Yet the Jumblatt family, like other elite families, uses 
forest and nature reserves in its Shouf stronghold as a means of exercising local political 
control and distributing patronage. 
 
We need, then, to recognize the gap between what NGOs envision in terms of the 
environment and citizenship, and what they are able to achieve and implement.  NGOs 
treat nature and green space as an antidote to sectarianism and as an instrument for 
creating the social encounters and interactions that will produce social cohesion in a 
country that has been marred by near-constant instability since its inception.  As well, they 
view environmental practices—whether eco-tourism, organic agriculture, or beach clean-
ups—as producing new modes of active citizenship and new kinds of self-sustaining, self-
governing, empowered citizens and communities.  But the political scene in Lebanon today 
remains highly divided, with sectarian-based patron-client exerting significant influence 
over people’s lives and their experiences of social membership.  Still, NGOs and 
environmentalism are leaving an imprint on Lebanese society—some segments of it 
perhaps more so than others.  Through the workings of NGOs, certain ways of talking about 
citizenship, national belonging, and nature have become relatively commonplace, if not 
universally accepted.  What becomes important in this context is to understand how 
environmentalist discourse is mobilized by different political actors toward not one, but 
multiple political projects, and how ideas of nature are incorporated into competing 
systems of political authority and power.   
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